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THE TROUBLE WITH THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
IN A POST-MODERN, MULTI-CULTURAL WORLD
CarrieMenkel-Meadow*

I.

INTRODUCrION

In this presentation I want to suggest the heretical notion that the
adversary system may no longer be the best way for our legal system to
deal with all of the matters that come within its purview. If the learning
of the late twentieth century has taught us anything it is that truth is
illusive, partial, interpretable, dependent on the characteristics of the
knowers, as well as the known, and most importantly, complex. In short,
there may be more than two sides to every story. Thus, the binary nature
of the structure of the adversary system and the particular methods and
tactics of its use in the legal system may often thwart some of the essential goals of any legal system. In this paper I will argue that our epistemology has sufficiently changed in this era of post-structural, postmodern knowledge so that we need to reexamine the attributes of the
adversary system as the "ideal type," as well as the practice on which our
legal system is based. While the adversary system has been justified for
the ways in which it satisfies a variety of truth and justice criteria', I
believe that how we consider those criteria are themselves contingent and
must be historicized and reconsidered as our knowledge base changes.
I will argue here that the adversary system is inadequate, indeed
dangerous, for satisfying a number of important goals of any legal or
dispute resolution system. My critique operates at several different levels
of the adversary system--epistemological, structural, remedial and
behavioral. I would like to suggest that we re-think both the goals that
our legal system should serve and the methods we use to achieve those
* Professor of Law, UCLA and Georgetown Law Schools; Director, UCLA Center for
Conflict Resolution. This essay was prepared for The Conference on Legal Ethics: The Core Issues
at Hofstra University, March 10-13, 1996 and presented at a variety of other academic meetings in
1995-96, including the Keck Lecture at William and Mary College of Law and at the international
Law and Society meetings in Glasgow, Scotland.
1. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse in The Good Lawyer. Lawyers' Roles and
Lawyers' Ethics (D. Luban, ed.1983)
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goals. For those who cleave to the adversary system 2 I want to shift the
burden of proof for them to convince us that the adversary system still
does its job better than other methods we might use.
My critiques are briefly as follows (to be further elaborated below):
Binary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute is not the best way
for us to learn the truth. Polarized debate distorts truth 3 , leaves out
important information4 , simplifies complexity and obfuscates where it
should clarify.' More significantly, some matters (mostly civil, but occasionally even a criminal case) are not susceptible to a binary (right/
wrong, win/lose) conclusion or solution. This may be so because we cannot with any degree of accuracy determine the facts, because conflicting,
but legitimate, legal rights give some entitlements to both (or all) parties 6 , or because human or emotional equities cannot be sharply divided
(parental rights in child custody, for example.)
Modem life presents us with complex problems7 which often
require complex and multi-faceted solutions. Courts, with what I have
called their "limited remedial imaginations" (limited by statute and common law to the powers of granting monetary damages or injunctions) 8
may not be the best institutional settings for resolving some of the disputes we continue to put before them.
Even if some form of the adversary system were to be defensible for
purposes of adjudication' in particular settings," the "adversary" model
2. Monroe Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics (1990), Id. Lawyers' Ethics in an
Adversary System (1975), Alan Dershowitz, The Best Defense (1982).
3. Marvin Frankel, Partisan Justice (1980), Id. The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123
U. Penn. L. Rev. 1031 (1975); Philip Shuchman, The Question of Lawyers' Deceit, 53 Conn. B.J.
101 (1979); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 Wm & Mary L.
Rev. 1303 (1995).
4. See e.g. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 Duke L. J.
921.
5. Consider how the scientific and circumstantial "evidence" emerged in the OJ Simpson
trial.
6. John Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice in Nomos XXI, Compromise in Ethics, Law
and Politics (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds. 1979); Id. Approaches to Court-Imposed
Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. L. Rev. 750 (1964).
7. As an example consider how manufacturers of dangerous or toxic products have utilized
bankruptcy proceedings to limit damages for their past acts and thus not only limit compensation for
the injured but threaten the economic security of present workers and others with whom such
companies do business.
8. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754 (1984).
9. Monroe Freedman was among the first to argue that our adversary system is
constitutionally mandated, residing in the Bill of Rights, see Freedman, Professionalism in the
American Adversary System, 41 Emory L. J. 467 (1992) in addition to other works. For other claims
that the adversary system is constitutionally mandated, at least in criminal cases, see Charles
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of the courtroom has inappropriately bled into and infected many other
aspects of lawyering, such as negotiating both "in the shadow of the
court'" and outside of it in lawyers' transactional work' 2 .
Even where there are simply facts to be determined, the complexities of modem life (such as the strong race' 3 issues implicated in a variety of our more notorious recent cases) make it problematic that even the
same "facts" will be interpreted the same way by different people' 4 .
Thus, it is not only the structures of the adversary system that I find
wanting, but how we think about the people within them.
Assumptions underlying the use of the adversary system-objectivity, neutrality, argument by opposition and refutation, appeals to common and shared values and fairness-have all been questioned by
modem scholars outside of (as well as inside) law and in my view, it is
time that we examine how these assumptions, which are often not "true"
have affected our legal system. Lay people claim a crisis of legitimacy in
the legal system (when the "race card" is deemed more important than
any other factor in a trial' 5 ) when jury verdicts are often not trusted and
we as scholars must take these critiques seriously.
Multi-culturalism, and all of the controversy it has spawned in the
universities' 6 , has at least reminded us that there is demographic, as well
Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 564 (1986) and Jay Sterling Silver, Professionalism and the Hidden
Assault on the Adversarial Process, 55 Ohio St. L. Rev. 855 (1994).
10. Many have argued that the criminal justice system demands more adversarialism than the
civil justice system and that ethics rules should reflect the differences, see e.g. Murray Schwartz, The
Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in The Good Lawyer (ed. D. Luban, 1983); Id. The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 66 (1978).
1I. The phrase is evoked by, but is not the same as, Robert Mnookin's and Lewis
Komhauser's, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L. J. 950 (1979).
12. For discussions of the inappropriateness of extreme forms of adversarialism in negotiation
see Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation, 31 UCLA 754 (1984); Gerald
Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1219 (1990); cf. James J. White,
Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiating, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J.
926; Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and The Ethics of Process, 64 NYU L. Rev. 493 (1989).
13. And many of these cases also demonstrate the power of binary thinking in black/white
terms, rather than the more complex multi-racial, multi-cultural world in which we live. ,
14. See e.g. Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives (1984).
15. See trials of Rodney King, Reginald Denny assaulters, OJ Simpson in Los Angeles to
name a few. Former District Attorney Ira Reiner opined that if the jury in the OJ Simpson case heard
the Mark Fuhrman tapes, their disgust at the racism exhibited therein would lead to an acquittal
(with a majority black jury)-in his view indicating that race would become more salient than any of
the factual evidence in the case, Interview on KNBC, August 17, 1995.
16. See e.g. Debating PC (Paul Berman, ed.1992), Alan Bloom, The Closing of the American
Mind; Russell Jacoby, Dogmatic Wisdom: How the Culture Wars Divert Education and Distract
America (1994); Robert Hughes, The Culture of Complaint (1993).
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as epistemological "positionality"' 7 and we do not all see things the same
way. Thus, with a healthy respect for the new knowledge about knowledge, we need to examine whether the adversary system helps or hinders
the way in which we sort out disputes, differences, misunderstandings
and wrongdoing.
Furthermore, the complexity of both modem life and modem lawsuits has shown us that there are often more than two sides to a dispute in
the sense that many more than two parties are involved in legal disputes
and transactions. Thus, procedures and forms like interpleader, joinder,
consolidation and class actions have attempted to allow the voices of
more than plaintiffs and defendants in, all the while still structuring the
discourse so that parties must ultimately align themselves on one side of
the adversarial line or another. Multi-party, multi-plex' 8 lawsuits or disputes may be distorted when only two sides are possible. Consider all of
the multi-party and complex policy issues before courts in environmental
clean-up and siting, labor disputes in the public sector, consumer actions,
antitrust actions, mass torts, bankruptcy, school financing and desegregation and other civil rights issues, to name a few examples.
Finally, modem adversarialism has been criticized for the ways in
which it teaches people to act toward each other. While I share some of
the views of the critics of the incivility of lawyers' 9 I am more concerned
that the rhetoric and structure of adversarial discourse prevents not just
better and nicer behavior,2" but more accurate and open thinking.
A culture of adversarialism, based on our legal system 21 , has
infected a wide variety of social institutions. While I will focus primarily
17. See Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harvard L. Rev. 829 (1990); cf.
Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 Harvard L. Rev. 1745 (1989).
18. Lon Fuller's essays on the structure of various legal forms remind us that complex multiplex, multiple party disputes may belong in forms other than adjudication, see Fuller, Mediation: Its
Form and Its Functions, 44 So. Cal. L. Rev. 305 (1971).
19. See e.g. Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28 Val. U. L.
Rev. 513 (1994).
20. 1 am on record as being "for" good and nice behavior wherever possible, see MenkelMeadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 Ga. St. L. Rev. 385 (1991).
21.. While I do not have time or space in the present essay to discuss the sources of
adversarialism it is important to note here that the legal system cannot be blamed for all
adversarialism. For some review of the history of American adversarialism see Lawrence Friedman,
A History of American Law (2d ed. 1985); Stephan Landsman, The Adversary System: A
Description and Defense (1984). Formal rules of logic, Aristotelian and classic philosophy have long
favored argument, dialectics and debate as an ideal way of learning the truth. Marxism and other
isms are based on the dialectics of reasoning of Hegel. At another level, competition in athletic and
military achievement has long been valued by a wide variety of cultures. Indeed, I am not the first to
argue that legal advocacy has borrowed too much from the practices and language of sports and war,
see Menkel-Meadow, Can A Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics? 41 J.Leg. Ed. 3 (1991).
Judge Frankel notes the phrase "sporting theory" of justice was probably cliched when Roscoe
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on the legal system and legal ethics here, consider how debate, argument
and adversarialism have, in recent years, dominated journalism, both
print and electronic media, political campaigns, educational discourse,
race relations, gender relations, labor and management relations, to name
only a few examples.
After I complete my critique of the adversary system, you will wonder what I seek to substitute in its place. It should be obvious that as a
post-modern, multi-cultural thinker I have no one panacea, solution or
process to offer-instead, I think we should think about a variety of different ways of structuring process in our legal system when our goals and
objectives are multiple. The determination of guilt may not require the
same process as allocating human, parental or civil rights or money.
There are situations where mediation, inquisitorial-bureaucratic investi22
gation, public fora or conversations, "intermediate sites of discourse, "
private problem-solving (negotiation) or group negotiation and coalition
and consensus building23 would better resolve the legal and other issues
involved. Thus, I am suggesting variety and diversity in our legal process
which will, in turn, require more diverse and complex thinking about
what legal ethics would be appropriate in different settings 24 . Some
might prefer to reform the adversary system to keep it protean enough to
remain inclusive, as a model, for all of our legal system. In my own view
this will not be adequate and we need to explore alternative models of
legal process and ethics that will better meet the needs of more complex
post-modern, multi-cultural disputes and issues.

Pound used it in his famous address in 1906, Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 29 ABA Rep. 395, 404 (1906), Frankel, The Search for Truth, supra note
3 at 1033. See also Elizabeth Thomburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports and Sex
Shape the Adversary System, 10 Wis. Women's L.J. 225 (1995). With the growing importance of
computers in our lives we may be entering a new age of mandated binarism.
22. See Lani Guinier and Susan Sturm, Reflections on Race Talk (mms. 1995) for an eloquent
description of how different forms and structures of process and conversation (such as within legal
education) can produce different levels of revelation, honest discussion and engagement and
ultimately, "truth" and understanding.
23. See Daniel Bussel, Coalition Formation in Bankruptcy by Creditor Committees, UCLA
L.Rev. (1996).
24. I am currently engaged in this project as I look at what ethics are required in alternative
dispute resolution settings that may differ from legal ethics in the adversary setting. See MenkelMeadow, Ancillary Practice and Conflicts of Interests: When Lawyer Ethics are Not Enough, 13(2)
Alternatives 15 (1995); cf. Geoffrey Hazard, When ADR is Ancillary to a Legal Practice, Law Firms
Must Confront Conflicts Issues, 12 (12) Alternatives 147 (1994). 1 currently chair the CPR
Commission on Ethics and Standards in Alternative Dispute Resolution.
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THE PITFALLS OF ADVERSARIALJBINARY
THINKING IN A POST-MODERN WORLD

While I cannot in this limited time or space review the full history
and sources of our particular approach to adversarialism, we should note
that the Anglo-American legal system did not originate the idea of oppositional presentations of "facts." Whether located in classical philosophical discourse25 or medieval scholastic disputations26 , the notion is that
truth will best be realized by contested, oppositional presentations of
"facts." At this point we should quickly note one important flaw or error
in the defense of the legal adversary system drawn from this tradition.
Whatever the flaws of oppositional thinking discussed below, philosbphers and others using this form of logic are at least theoretically committed to a genuine search for the truth. This is not the motivating ideal
when the adversary system is harnessed to the legal system with an ethics
regime that places duty to the client at least as high, if not higher than,
the duty to truth 27. While philosophers may seek the truth, lawyers seek
to achieve their client's interests and "win," which may entail simply
obfuscating the other side's case (as in the "creation" of reasonable doubt
in the criminal case) or leaving out important facts if they are deemed
harmful (in either civil or criminal cases). Thus, even if it can be
defended as a procedure of knowledge and truth-finding in other settings,
the particular use of the oppositional/adversary model in legal disputes
lacks this important quality-the genuine search for truth.
Despite the longevity and robustness of adversarialism as a mode of
human discourse 28 , even some philosophers and epistemologists have
25. As my colleague philosopher Stephen Munzer points out, however, the dialogues of Plato
or Socrates were not "real" but staged efforts to canvass and dispute particular ideas. Nevertheless,
philosophers thought that we would best arrive at the truth by setting forth ideas in opposition to
each other to be refuted. See Janice Moulton, A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method in
Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology and
Philosophy of Science (Sandra Harding & Merrill Hintikka, eds. 1983).
26. The medieval universities sought knowledge by public "disputations" and debates.
Consider that our modem "defense" of the dissertation derives from this tradition.
27. Many scholars, judges and practitioners have discussed whether truth or other goals are the
primary rationale for our adversary system, see e.g. Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975); Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (1961); John
Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1485
(1966); Morley R. Gorsky, The Adversary System in Philosophical Law (ed. Richard Bronaugh,
1978). While some argue that our system values "justice" or human and individual freedom and
dignity over truth; others suggest that winning and victory are the real goals that compete with truth
and justice; see also Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41
Vand. L. Rev. 697 (1988).
28. There are other modes of human discourse from which we could choose-the scientific
method, for example, which while it needs to "falsify" propositions with contrary data does not set
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come to question its value as the best way to understand the world. It is
this feature of post-modernism that I want to critically apply to the adversary system as we know it in the legal system.
Expressed in most general terms, the works of a variety of philosophers, literary critics, art and architecture critics, social scientists and
legal scholars, have come to question whether there is any "truth" out
there that is knowable and stable. Post-modernism expresses some skepticism, if not cynicism, in the belief that there are facts or interpretations
29
of facts which are immutable, universal, global and discoverable.
Whether by literary deconstruction (uncovering the suppressed meanings
of a text that render texts indeterminate), feminist epistemology (seeking
3
to uncover the biases of the scientist in the science "), philosophical or
linguistic decompositions of language, or in our own field, critical legal
3
studies' exposure of the indeterminancies of our laws , the legacy of
post-modernism is that truth is not fixed, meanings are "located" provisionally, not "discovered ' 32 and that people who "find" truth (whether
judges, juries, critics and yes, even scientists) have interests (social, economic, political, racial, gender) that affect how they see the world.
out to prove something by juxtaposing its opposite. There is conversation, storytelling, mediation,
and consciousness-raising-all of which are more circular and less structured in method. There are
also dangerous monologic (or false adversarial) forms like inquisitions and Star Chambers. And
there are other legal systems-civil, mediational, bureaucratic.
29. For an excellent summary of the major contributions of postmodemism to social science
from which much of the above discussion is drawn see Pauline Rosenau, Post-Modemism in the
Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, Intrusions (1992).
30. See e.g. Sandra Harding, Whose Knowledge? Whose Science? (1991).
31. As one useful summary among many, see Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies
(1987).
32. These phrases are Rosenau's. Thus, even though there is "truth" in many cases-ie. OJ
Simpson did or did not kill his ex-wife and Ronald Goldman, since we have only circumstantial
evidence, jurors must "interpret" and give meaning to the evidence-thus there will be variability in
how they determine the facts. See Albert J. Moore, Inferential Streams: The Articulation and
Illustration of The Trial Advocate's Evidentiary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 611 (1987) In my
view, and as part of my critique of the adversary system, most trial advocacy texts (and I am a
former Trial Advocacy teacher) still assume far too rational a fact-finding process, see Thomas
Mauet, Fundamentals of Trial Techniques (3d ed. 1992); J.Alexander Tanford, The Trial Process:
Law, Tactics and Ethics (2d ed 1993). Practical lawyer guides are much more likely to attempt to
deal with the emotional or "arational" (note this is not irrational) aspects of fact finding and
interpretation. For one attempt to deal with some aspects of "emotional" arguments see Albert
Moore, Paul Bergman, David Binder, Trial Advocacy: Inferences, Arguments and Trial Techniques
(1996) (see especially chapter 9 on "silent argument.") Too many of the trial texts also treat all jurors
as the same, fungible or "the average juror," instead of recognizing the clear reality of widely
disparate reactions to the same facts by different people who may process "facts" through very
different "filters" or "generalizations." Despite all of the wonderful empirical jury studies (see e.g.
Valerie Hans & Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury (1986); Steven Penrod and Reid Hastie, Inside the
Jury, 1983) we have little that focuses on the "interpretative acts" of jurors, as analogous to the
interpretative acts of readers in literature.
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In addition to interpretations of texts, meanings and facts, post-modernists have questioned the very notion of a unified self who has a stable
set of characteristics, values and attributes with which to process information. Since we occupy so many multiple roles in modem society,
being powerful in some (father) but subordinated in others (worker), our
knowledge is structured and filtered through the multiplicity of our social
roles and deeply affected by the context-both present and our own personal and group histories. Thus, if we buy any of this (and I buy enough
of it to consider what effects it might have on the finding of facts, the
interpretation of law and the production of "legal knowledge") we must
ask how the legal system can confidently assess truth and assign
remedies.
In an important book33 describing the significance of post-modernism for how we know what we know in the social sciences, Pauline
Rosenau has distinguished between more skeptical, nihilistic postmodems who believe that "truth" is always partial, transitory and uncertain and affirmative post-moderns who seek instead to broaden and
increase the methods of knowledge acquisition that we use. Thus, affirmative post-moderns would include the recent spate of narrative writers in
legal scholarship3 4 who seek to increase the stories that are told and
heard3 5 in our legal system and to appeal to empathy36 and affective, as
well as rational, 37 ways of knowing.
Both groups of post-moderns share a skepticism that truth can accurately be "represented." This claim, which originates in art and literary
criticism, has some dangerous teaching for our rules of evidence and trial
procedure. While our various exclusionary rules are designed to protect
against some distortions (such as in the over-probative and prejudicial
forms of evidence which are often excluded) in representation of "the
facts," oppositional fact presentation may be criticized for necessarily
33. See note 29 supra.
34. See e.g. Symposium: Narrative and Storytelling, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (1989); Robin
West, Narrative, Authority and Law (1994); Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights
(1991); Toni Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling and The Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds?, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099 (1987).
35. For the vigorous debate about how these stories can be "validated" see Suzanna Sherry &
Daniel Farber, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan L. Rev. 807
(1993); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing The Call of Stories, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 971 (1991).
36. Lynn Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1574 (1987); Menkel-Meadow,
The Power of Narrative in Empathetic Learning: Post-Modernism and the Stories of Law, 2 UCLA
L. Rev. 287 (1992).
37. For an evocative argument that there are many ways (some of them gendered) of learning
and "knowing" see Belenky et. al. Women's Ways of Knowing (1985).
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involving extreme or distorted "representations" of the past acts38 and
motives which may be impossible to "re-present" in a courtroom.
Let me illustrate the particular dilemma of oppositional, binary
thinking at trial when linked with recent work in cognitive psychology
and trial practice. If we take seriously the recent teaching that facts
presented to fact-finders are processed through "schemas," "filters" or
common narratives 39 then the presentation of two oppositional stories or
conclusions may color how all facts are heard. Consider how the framing
of a story by both sides then colors how each piece of evidence is interpreted. The oppositional story may work well when there is an off/on,
guilt/innocence determination to be made 4" (though it still carries the
danger that all incremental facts will be processed through a pre-existing
frame4 1 ) but will not work as well when factual findings, legal conclusions and mixed fact/law questions are at issue: comparative negligence,
business necessity defenses, excuse and justification in criminal law, best
interest of the child, to name a few examples. Thus, my argument here is
that the "false" or "exaggerated" representation 4 2 of oppositional stories
may oversimplify the facts4 3 and not permit adequate consideration of
fact interpretations or conclusions that either fall somewhere in between
or are totally outside of the range of the presentations of the lawyers."
Indeed, in one version of post-modernism we could read the adversary
system as a totally arbitrary system for imposing order (binary) where
38. At this point, some readers will realize that some of the post-modem attack on knowledge
would reject any legal system. If the truth is unknowable, inquisitorial, bureaucratic and
"alternative" systems of dispute resolution would fare no better in discerning facts.
39. See e.g. O'Barr and Conley, Rules vs Relationships (1990); Lance Bennett and Martha
Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom (1981).
40. Consider how you "filter" each of the individual facts in the OJ Simpson case given your
current "conclusion" about whether he is guilty or innocent. What would it take to change your
mind? Consider this same question in light of more complicated issues-does Microsoft have too
large a share of the software market and what should be done if you think it does?
41. Here is my de rigueur cite to Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(1970) that tells us we can understand reality only through historically contingent paradigms (like
the lawyer's oppositional stories) which do, on occasion, shift.
42. What post-modernists call constructivism is the advocate's stock in trade.
43. Stanley Fish has gone so far as to say that all knowledge claims are merely the result of
contextual and artificial agreements among professional communities. Fish, Doing What Comes
Naturally (1989). So, if we cannot adequately justify the adversary system and most philosophers
have agreed that we cannot not (see Luban, supra note I) then the adversary system itself is the
product of our professional "conspiracy" to perpetuate its existence. It has not been even weakly
empirically validated. Luban, supra note 1; cf. Thibaut and Walker, Procedural Justice (1975); Tyler
and Lind, The Social Psychology of Procedure (1988).
44. Jury nullification may represent one effort to escape not only the law but the need for
binary fact determinations-maybe somebody was a "little bit guilty." (ie. entrapped but guilty or
guilty but not responsible). Obviously, the more varied possibilities in equity also represent an effort
to avoid the draconian effects of law's oppositional possibilities.
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none exists at all, where everything is related to everything else and we
can not rationally determine relevance.45
An implicit, but sometimes explicit, aspect of all post-modernism is
a skepticism about both objectivity and neutrality. This has serious implications for our adversary system, not only for the advocate's role, but for
the "neutral, passive" judge as well. This argument of post-modernism
has most explicitly been made in law by the work of critical legal scholars who have demonstrated both the linguistic contingency of law (its
indeterminacy) and then its manipulation by particular interests (economic or class based in critical legal studies, race-based in critical race
theory and gender based in feminist legal thought46 ). Most of the work of
critical legal scholars has focused on the law and rules-the "texts" of
the legal system. But the attacks on certainty, legal knowledge and neutrality have clear and dangerous implications for legal process and the
adversary system as well.47
Thus, "neutral" judges, either as passive umpires of a trial process
or more active fact-finders will likely have predispositions to one side of
the story or their own interpretation4 8 which might not be uncovered by
party-initiated presentation of evidence where the lawyers cannot learn
what the judges' own story is. While some use this post-modern strategy
to critique the false claims of objectivity and neutrality, others suggest
we should simply acknowledge that values are different and we may not
have total unanimity over "fundamental interests," but rather should
45. This view is also consistent with chaos theory-that causality is not linear as we modem
science romanticists believe. Consider the arguments about what is relevant in the ever expanding
soap opera of the OJ Simpson case (is what Detective Fuhrman said about Judge Ito's wife relevant
to the guilt or innocence of Simpson?) Where does the seamless web of the facts end?
46. In feminist epistemology more generally, philosophers of science have argued that even
the construction of questions of "truth" in science have been dependent on the "bias" of the
masculinist view of reality. Consider the metaphors of competition and survival of the fittest and the
struggle of the cell as examples, Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (1986) and Evelyn Fox
Keller, A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock (1987).
47. 1 am reminded of the article in Time magazine a few years ago which attempted to
describe the tenets of critical legal studies for a lay readership. The article concluded, if I remember
correctly, with a statement by the reporter that there was nothing so dramatic in critical legal studies
teaching-"even the man in the street knows that law is the tool of the powerful." One could ask
whether the laity retained more of a loyalty or belief in the adversary system and its process than law
itself, until recently. Have years of TV shows like Perry Mason and Law and Order persuaded the
public that the adversary system does find the truth and punish the guilty? Does the "person in the
street" now have as much skepticism about the process of the adversary system, after a few well
televised "miscarriages of justice"? (Or, maybe it is just Los Angeles. Why are all the bizarre trials
here-Rodney King, Reginald Denny, the Menendez brothers, OJ Simpson? Is LA the ultimate postmodem city? See Mike Davis, Los Angeles: City Of Quartz, (1991).)
48. For evidence of this see Gender and Race Bias Task Force Reports completed in many
state and several federal jurisdictions.
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make explicit the appeal to different values, beliefs or emotions that are
held by fact-finders. a9 Thus, there may be more than "two stories" in the
courtroom if litigants attempt to deal with the great varieties of values or
emotional "frames" that could influence a fact-finder5 ° . In my view, this
reflects the reality of life in a post-modem, multi-cultural world (the recognition that if "truth" is to be arrived at, it is best done through a multiplicity of stories and deliberations, rather than only two (see below) but
how this will be structured into a litigation system, which is still based on
oppositional evidence presentation, remains to be seen.
There is one other element of post-modernism that I want to address
briefly here and that is the explicit recognition that we do reason in
binary oppositions 5 with a hierarchy of values usually subordinating one
side of the opposition as in male/female, white/black, rule/discretion,
law/equity, market/family, etc. 52 In post-modernism this is the method of
deconstruction-the recognition that every "text" has its ambiguity, its
negation, its opposition, its "silence." In some versions the idea is to
reverse or resituate the oppositions, which, of course preserves them. 53
But in some forms the purpose of deconstruction is to make clear that
binary oppositions do not explain the world. Hierarchies of claims hide
more than they reveal. Thus, many in Los Angeles hoped that the beaters
of their acts rather than
of Rodney King would be convicted because
54
thing."
black
or
white
because it was "a
49. Indeed, some have argued that the split between emotion and rationality is itself a "false
dichotomy." See Joan Cocks, Wordless Emotions: Some Critical Reflections on Radical Feminism,
13 Politics and Society 27 (1984); Menkel-Meadow, Women as Law Teachers: Toward The
Feminization of Legal Education, in Humanistic Education in Law (Columbia Univ. 1981).
50. For an eloquent description of how the categories of law and the structure of legal process
often suppress other "stories" and the truth see Lucie White, Subordination, Survival Skills and
Sunday Shoes: Notes On the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1990) (describing how a
client in a welfare hearing refuses to use the advocates' suggested arguments to fit existing
categories of law and instead insists on telling her own story (of truth) which demands justice from
the heart, where the law will not recognize her claim).
51. The post-moderns most associated with this observation are Saussure in linguistics,
Jacques Derrida in literary criticism and Jacques Lacan in psychoanalytic theory.
52. My personal favorite explication of the effects of this binary opposition in law is Fran
Olsen's The Sex of Law in The Politics of Law (D. Kairys, ed., 2d. 1991).
53. This is the argument that some feminists claim women are different and better than men
which preserves gender difference. One story is still better than another. See Joan Williams,
Dissolving the Sameness-Difference Debate: A Post-Modem Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist
and Critical Race Theory, 1991 Duke L. J. 296.
54. And similarly, many hoped the beaters of Reginald Denny would be convicted too because
of what they did, not because of a need to set an "oppositional" verdict to the travesty of the original
acquittal in the King beating case. (Note how these cases are known by the victims rather than by the
perpetrators-neither Rodney King nor Reginald Denny were "on trial.")
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Taken out of its post-modem context, deconstruction is useful for
critics of the adversary system because it exposes how the "text" of
adversarial argument distorts55 as do the literary texts analyzed by deconstructionists. In concrete legal terms (and none of these claims are new or
original to my argument) oppositional presentation often (not always 6 )
distorts the truth 57 by making extreme claims58 , by avoiding any potentially "harmful" facts, by refusing to acknowledge any truth in the opposition59 , by only permitting two, rather than a multiplicity of stories to be
55. As someone who serves in a third party neutral capacity, as an arbitrator and mediator, I
am often frustrated (as was Judge Frankel) with the distortions and exaggerations made by counsel
in pursuing their claims.
56. Consider the contrary informing principles of baseball arbitration which asks two sides to
make offers which are intended to be less extreme because the arbitrator must choose one without
any modification. The theory, if not the practice, is that this principle of dispute resolution will
encourage reasonableness. Some would argue that good advocates do this as well--if they are
hoping to have a fact finder buy their whole story they will try to tell the least extreme, most
reasonable story.
57. For a nice catalogue of the distortions in presented evidence through the adversarial
method see Morley Gorsky (a practicing lawyer), The Adversary System in Bronaugh, supra note
27, listing as sources of incorrect or inequality of evidence production where l)there is a reluctant
witness (whom both parties may be afraid to call; 2)there is a lack of awareness of a potential
witness because of the lack of independent investigation; 3)there are inequalities in expert witness
production as a result of economics; 4)witnesses are coached or "over-prepared"; 5) counsel is more
inept than his opponent; and 6)a witness is inept (ie. may be truthful but fearful and therefore very
vulnerable on cross-examination). For my own arguments about how lawyers have to transform their
clients' stories to meet the needs and requirements of the legal system, see Menkel-Meadow, The
Transformation of Disputes By Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Doesn't Tell Us, 2
Mo. J. Disp. Res. 25 (1985).
58. Many justify the adversary system as human evolution from trial by real combat to modem
"bloodless" combat in the courtroom. Perhaps the distortions of modern verbal combat have outlived
their usefulness and we are ready to evolve to the next level of a legal system without combat. For an
interesting description of variations in lawyer aggressiveness (even outside of litigation) see Neil
Lewis, At the Bar: Wherein a New York Style Litigator is cast as the heavy in the Whitewater affair,
N.Y. Times, July 28, 1995, B-18 (describing the variations in the New York lawyer who "fights at
all costs for a client" versus the Washington lawyer who is more concerned about "how things look."
(remarks attributed to Bernard Nussbaum, former counsel to the President). Lewis suggests that
advice not to turn over documents to the investigators might be successful in defending a corporate
wrongdoer but is not an appropriate tactic for a public official who must inspire trust and higher
moral standards.
59. Cognitive psychologists have named this phenomenon "reactive devaluation." We do not
hear the validity of a claim or argument or offer made by "the other side" simply because it comes
from the other side. This particular distortion of adversary approaches to dispute resolution has
become the focus of those studying negotiation and mediation. If we can't hear the truth of what our
opposition has to tell us then a third party mediator can often reduce this distortion by being a more
"neutral" bearer of offers or information. See Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and
Conflict Resolution in Kenneth Arrow et al. (eds.) Barriers to Conflict Resolution (1995); Robert
Mnookin, Introduction at 22-23, Id.; Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of the
Barriers to Resolution of Conflict, 8 (2) Ohio St. J. of Dispute Res. 235 (1993).
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told, by refusing to share information or ironically by strategically giving or demanding too much information, 61 by manipulating information
(as in the "battle of experts,") by making the true look false (cross-examining a truthful witness) or the false look true (by offering false or misleading evidence or active "coaching" of witnesses).6 2
Another common complaint about the adversary system demonstrates one of the claims made by deconstructionists. In litigation, the
hierarchy of opposition will often be determined by the unequal
resources of the parties. In its ideal and abstracted form the adversary
system clearly contemplates adversaries of equal skill and economic support-the result should not depend on the resources, or "skill" of the
argument's representative, but on the merits of the argument, 6 3 yet we all
know "the haves come out ahead." '
Whatever the persuasiveness or merits of post-modernism's attack
on truth or knowledge generally, its teachings are extremely problematic
for the legal system 65 . Whatever the problems with only two stories, or
the unknowability of what really happened, the legal system must find
facts and make decisions if any semblance of order is to be maintained.
The legal system's problem with post-modernism is the same as epistemology's-how can we evaluate anything; by what standards are we to
60. See Stuart Taylor, Sleazy in Seattle, American Lawyer, April 1994 (describing sanctions
assessed against Bogle & Gates for failing to turn over in discovery documents indicating medical
warnings for drug causing serious injury to plaintiff child). Many legal ethicists, including the
distinguished Geoffrey Hazard, opined that our discovery system and our rules of legal ethics did not
require the disclosure of these documents.
61. John Setear, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 Yale L. J.
352 (1982); Id. The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence and
Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 569 (1989) (applying the analysis of game theory and the
Prisoner's Dilemma to discovery abuse, based on oppositional strategic behavior by opposing
litigants).
62. Murray Schwartz, Making the True Look False and the False Look True, 41 Sw. Law
Review 1135 (1988).
63. This is what happens when the fault lies with the man and not with the art (i.e. the quality
of representation), see Martin Golding, On the Adversary System and Justice in Bronaugh, supra
note 27 at 112. See also Plato's Gorgias for arguments about the morality of the "bought" or partisan
rhetorician. In post-modem parlance, the case will turn on the performance or "performativity" of
the advocate, rather than on the "facts," thereby demonstrating once again that "truth" in the legal
system is not objective or necessarily rational.
64. Marc Galanter, Why The Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974).
65. Indeed, one might suggest that the label of "nihilism" attached to the critical legal scholars
by Paul Carrington and others (see Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. of Leg. Ed. 222 (1984)
represents the very fear of the validity of some of these arguments-if they are persuasive they deal
very significant blows to the entire structure of law and the legal system.
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judge anything? Thus, even critical scholars like Joel Handler6 6 who
acknowledge that even if no one "procedure has access to truth or reality,
including science, '67 we must use some measure for assessing facts and
acting. For Handler, as for others, that something else is a non-foundational pragmatism-"the test of knowledge is efficacy."'68 But Handler,
like other pragmatists (and I include myself in this group 69 ,) envision a
greater multiplicity of stories being told, of more open, participatory and
democratic processes, yielding truths that are concrete, but contextualized, explicitly focusing on who finds "truth" for whose benefit. The
feminist epistemologist, Sandra Harding, has called this "strong objectivity," when the interests of truth finders and the questions they ask and
answer are part of the description of the "truth ' 7 . In the final section of
this paper I will explore how these observations may help us both reform
some of the defects of the adversary system as well as open up and more
radically transform our whole legal process, with obvious implications
(requiring further exploration) for our core concepts of legal ethics. But
first-some more complaints...
III.

THE LIMITED REMEDIAL POWER OF ADVERSARIALISM

The structure of adversary argument that limits cases to two "sides"
(or a limited set of other party arguments with joinder, interpleader and
sub-classes) is made more problematic by what our adversary system (as
exemplified by courts) permits as resolutions to disputes that come
before it. I have argued at length elsewhere that courts that are empowered to grant money damages, guilty or not-guilty verdicts and injunctions (which are more often negative than positive) greatly limit what
results an adversary argument can achieve.7 ' While I am mindful of the
66. Joel Handler, Postmodernism, Protest and the New Social Movements; Presidential
Address, 26 Law & Society Review 697 (1992)
67. Id. at 703.
68. Id. at 702
69. For explorations of the John Deweyian sources of this modem legal pragmatism see such
sources as Thomas Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stanford L. Rev. 787 (1989); Margaret
Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1699 (1991); Joseph Singer, Should
Lawyers Care About Philosophy? 1989 Duke L. J. 1752; Cornel West, The American Evasion of
Philosophy (1989).
70. Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (1991), Id. (ed.) The Racial Economy of
Science: Toward A Democratic Future (1993) at 17-19. "Democratic values, ones that prioritize
seeking out criticisms of dominant beliefs from the perspective of the lives of the least advantaged
groups, tend to increase the objectivity of the results of research." at 18. Note the structural parallel
in this argument to John Rawls' "veil of ignorance" in political philosophy. John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice (1973).
71. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8.
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fact that parties are always free to exit the system and settle for their own
more tailored solutions, the truth is settlements are often constrained by
the limited remedial imagination of lawyers who bargain "in the shadow
of both the court and the law." Thus, without rehearsing my earlier arguments here, I want to suggest that we should think carefully about what
cases require binary solutions (and I believe there are many cases that
do) and which do not. At the same time, we need to examine why this
one mode of dispute resolution still so dominates our thinking about
legal problem solving 72 . Whatever efforts have been made to act on
expanding the scope of processes and remedies recognized by courts, 7 3
there continues to be a co-optation of these processes by determined
advocates. 74 As I have argued before, expanding the stories, the interests,
the issues and the things at stake actually enhances the likelihood of finding "trades" and other creative solutions to problems so that contentious
argument can be minimized and more party needs can be satisfied. 75 This
will require a great deal of re-education and reorientation to accomplish 7 6-indeed, major cultural, not just ethical, change among lawyers.
To think creatively is not necessarily the same as thinking critically or
analytically and the negative and reactive thinking produced by adversarial argument may limit more open ways of conceiving of solutions to
problems 77.
72. And business, and interpersonal relationships and life in general. See for example the
interesting but depressing example of application of competitive thinking, derived from game theory,
to a wide range of problem solving in Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking
Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics and Everyday Life (1991).
73. Such as multi-door courthouses and other efforts to enact Frank Sander's ideas about
multiple processes. See Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 FRD 111 (1976); see also Susan Sturm,
The Promise of Participation, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 981 (1993); see also Susan Sturm, A Normativie
Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 Geo. L.J. 1355 (1991).
74. See Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in An Adversary Culture, 19 Fla. St. L. Rev. 1
(1990). My personal favorites include one advocate who wrote a letter to his adversary stating, "I
have filed an ADR against you," and a recent continuing education program for defense lawyers
which offers advice on "winning in ADR and negotiation", ADR For the Defense, Defense
Research Inc. (Program held in San Francisco, Sept. 21-23, 1995).
75. My favorite illustration of this comes from a UCLA faculty cocktail hour in which several
of my colleagues picked at the same bowl of cocktail mix. None of us were in competition as some
chose pretzels. others nuts and others wheatchex-we wore down the bowl cooperatively and with
all of our needs being met. We value different things and the more "stories" and interests we get on
the table, the more likely we can arrive at a mutually agreeable solution, by finding complementary,
rather than competitive, interests.
76. See Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems: Not Make Them: Integrating ADR in the Law
School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. Rev. 801 (1993).
77. See e.g. James J. Adams, Conceptual Blockbusting: A Guide to Better Ideas (1986);
Martin Gardner, Aha! Insight (1978).
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I will be so heretical as to suggest that even some criminal matters
(most often thought to be the paradigm case for requiring binary solutions, followed by punishment) might be susceptible to other processes
and remedies such as Victim-Offender Mediation 7 8 which attempts to
create (a guilt-imposing) relationship between offenders and victims of
some small crimes to encourage restitutionary remedies rather than punishment. If we are to defeat the hold that crime has on us we must
broaden and increase our responses (not to mention look for remedies,
treatments and processes to deal with the crushing caseloads) and
searches for solutions, especially where there is not enough room for all
at the inn (the prison).7 9
In the civil arena, where I have done most of my work, we must
consider those cases which do not easily lend themselves to right or
wrong answers 8° or to more binary solutions. Often, imposed solutions
by third parties, like courts, do not deal with underlying causes of ongoing conflicts or disputes, especially if personal or relationship issues are
at stake (and this includes commercial as well as civil rights matters) and
they may therefore, not be enduring solutions. The courts, to their credit,
have realized this (and equity has always been a place of more diverse
remedies), though not without a vast outpouring of scholarship and criticism of the difficult road courts take when they attempt to order more
complex remedial measures.8 t Most recently, courts have supervised
other kinds of dispute resolution, particularly in class action settlements
of consumer and anti-trust cases 82 and mass torts. 83 We must look to
78. See e.g. Robert Coates & John Gehm, Victim Meets Offender: An Evaluation of VictimOffender Reconciliation Programs (1985); cf. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation in
Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 Emory L. J. 1247 (1994).
79. Obviously, this implicates more important and complex questions of criminal law and
policy. Learning who will benefit from such perceived more "lenient schemes" will be difficult.
80. Winning may not be everything and often a short term win is followed by long term
resentment and efforts to execute a judgment or monitor an injunction. Segregation is wrong but we
now wonder whether busing was the only or best solution. Some tried to look for other solutions
earlier (like equality of financing, see Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters:Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L. J. 470 (1976).
81. Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281
(1976); Stephen Yeazell & Theodore Eisenberg, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional
Litigation, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 465 (1980).
82. Here my personal favorite is the books I received from Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich,
instead of cash, in settlement of an anti-trust overcharge in bar review courses case. (Not unlike the
coupons for air fare discounts we have recently received in settlement of airline anti-trust action).
These are illustrations of how "in-kind" or other forms of compensation are not zero-sum-the
books and coupons give some benefit to the defendants, decreasing their cost for our recompense.
83. As in the Virginia bankruptcy court's supervision of the Dalkon Shield Claimants' Trust
ADR program and the proposed (now shaky) settlement of the breast implant litigation in claims
facilities.
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ways to preserve limited funds for fair distribution to all deserving claimants as well as look for opportunities where people may desire things
other than or in addition to monetary relief.84 Thus, choice of remedy and
more "remedial" imagination should affect the choices we make about
what processes to use and how adversarialism may greatly restrict what
can be accomplished.
IV.

How

MULTI-CULTURALISM (OR PLURALISM)

CHALLENGES THE

ADVERSARY SYSTEM

Recall that when we speak of the adversary system we say the
"Anglo-American" adversary system. The inquisitorial system of civil
law countries, the mediation of Asian countries, the dispute resolution
processes of Native Americans8 5 and the "moots" of some African cultures remind us that our legal process is culturally specific and chosen,
not given. Here I want to explore, very controversially I am sure, the
cultural assumptions of our adversary system as they operate both at the
national and international level. Again, while I do not have the time or
space to do a complete review of comparative legal systems,86 it is
important to recognize that other systems may still have something to
teach us. With our increased participation in international treaties and
tribunals such as GATT and the Law of the Sea Treaty, dealing with
multiple parties with different cultures and legal regimes, has revealed
that we will have to participate in alternative (to us) forms of dispute
resolution and culturally complex international cooperation.
Within our own borders multicultural concerns make themselves
felt when immigrants from other systems either fear or will not use our
system because they do not understand or trust it, 87 or when it is alien to
84. Both Judge Jack Weinstein and I have noted that in addition to cash, claimants in mass tort
matters do seek some cathartic value in the process they desire, Weinstein, Individual Justice in
Mass Tort Litigation (1995); Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Mass Tort Settlements: When the Rules
Meet the Road, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1159 (1995).
85. See Mediation Quarterly, Special Issue Native American Dispute Resolution, 1993.
86. See e.g. John Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems
of Western Europe and Latin America (1969); Miran Damaska, Structures of Authority and
Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 Yale L. J. 480 (1975); Id. Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction
and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 506 (1973); John
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (1985); Stanley
Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55 Cal L. Rev.
1284 (1967) as a few examples.
87. Lawyers working with immigrant groups in communities like Los Angeles have reported
to me that some national groups, like some South and Central Americans will not use the adversary
system because it is unfamiliar to them (and they often carry with them distrust of official courts
from perceptions about corrupt regimes in their native lands-are we less corrupt?). Obviously,
access to courts and lawyers plays a large role in this. But some lawyers and community groups
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what they know. While our melting pot and assimilationist ideology
would suggest that such recent newcomers to our shores should simply
acculturate themselves to one of the few "all-American" institutions,
instead I think we might take the opportunity of reexamining our system
for ethnocentric bias and try to imagine other dispute resolution institutions we might create. The very premises of our system, that "winning"
is all and that harms suffered are monetized may not be culturally congruent with all members of our society.
At its most disturbing and controversial we have the question of
what commitment our own citizens have to a system that some perceive
delivers them nothing but injustice. Many would argue that it is not the
structure of the adversary system itself, but the inequalities of resource
distribution and access within it that has caused many disempowered
groups to feel less committed to the legal system. Others would suggest
that the adversary system itself and the expensive details of its use exac88
erbate whatever social power differentials there already are.
I think the issue goes beyond access and resources within the process. As Patricia Williams has so eloquently reminded us in her book
Alchemy of Race and Rights, some in our society (African-Americans)
have been the "acted upon" in law (as objects of law as property in slave
legacy) and did not historically participate in the creation of our legal
process. As some have criticized our "science" for its exclusion of particular voices 89 we must wonder what a more multi-cultural and integrated
group of framers might have chosen for a process if it had been informed
by a full representation of our varieties of immigrant cultures. While it
seems true that many cultures think in binary terms (i.e. ying/yang), it is
not so clear that the dichotomies or binarisms are hierarchically arranged
in the same manner or that binary thinking must necessarily structure
legal culture. Chinese mediation, derived from Confucian principles, is
designed to seek "harmony, not truth."9
What would it mean if we
report that some national groups prefer to create their own community dispute resolution processes
(a continuation of American immigrant community dispute development as chronicled by Jerold
Auerbach in Justice Without Law? (1983). It is also true that some cultures reject our American
commodification and monetization of disputing. In another recent example, an elderly Japanese man
learned that he had been paid less than many of his inferiors. His Americanized children urged him
to sue but he said he valued his dignity and the respect he had had in the workplace more than his
desire for money or to make trouble. (Jan Dizard to Howard Gadlin, personal communication.)
88. Did the "playing of the race card" cause a majority black jury to acquit OJ Simpson as a
"pay back" for the majority white jury in the Rodney King beating case?
89. See Harding, supra note 70.
90. A value that is strongly criticized by those who seek to preserve our adversarial system in
the face of encroachment by dangerous ADR methods. See e.g. Laura Nader, Controlling Processes
in The Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Reform Disputing Ideology,
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redefined our legal system to seek "problem-solving" as its one of its
goals rather than "truth?"'" While we remain committed to third party
"neutrals" who are detached and unbiased, other cultures value decisionmakers who are enmeshed in the community and understand it and have
"wisdom" from experience. 92
I fear the adversary system itself and what it has contributed to the
larger culture has hindered rather than helped race and ethnic relations9 3
by polarizing discussion and by continuing to perpetuate its own form of
bi-polar thinking. Third party impositions of solutions seldom get at root
causes of conflicts or provide enduring solutions. Black-white relations,
as another binary construct, remain the paradigm for thinking about race,
despite the growing multiplicity of race and ethnicities and diversification of our society and slowly, the legal profession itself94 . In my view,
we need to rethink ways to permit more voices, more stories, more complex versions of reality to inform us and to allow all people to have views
that are not fully determined by their "given" identities in our culture. To
that end let me turn to some proposals for reform of the adversary
system.

9 Ohio St. J. Disp. Res. 1046 (1993); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. Chi.L.Rev. 494 (1986). 1 call these critics "litigation romanticists," see MenkelMeadow, supra note 84.
91. 1 can imagine huge outpourings of objections here-where is justice, punishment,
deterrence-all of the articulated current goals of our legal system. I offer this example as simply an
illustration of how we select our goals and could select others. I am not suggesting that we solve
problems by ignoring justice. Or, as Rodney King put it, why shouldn't our legal system be
constructed to "help us all just get along" in such a diverse world?
92. As a feminist, I am not endorsing the "wise elder" form of mediation found in many
cultures in the world, because they do tend to be paternalistic and exclusive of women, but I am
suggesting that the principles informing such choices are different than ours and might be worth
examining in some areas. The use of "substantive expertise" in some forms of ADR (mini-trials,
arbitration and mediation) reflects this desire for a knowledgeable (and perhaps "interested" or
"biased") third party neutral and further complicates the questions of ethics and conflicts of interest.
See e.g. Poly-Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp 1487 (D.Utah, 1995) discussing complications
of applying conflicts rules when small group of skilled lawyers (specializing in computer industry in
a relatively small area) act as both litigators and mediators.
93. So do Lani Guinier and Susan Sturm, by looking for other ways to facilitate the study of
and conversations about race.
94. 1 have, in other contexts, talked about the importance of diversifying the profession for
purposes of broadening how we think about law and its solutions, as well as its practice. MenkelMeadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42
U.Miami L. Rev. 29 (1987) Id. Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the
Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering, 44 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 621

(1994).
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REFORMING THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM

I am torn at this point between choosing from among the most
incremental of changes to reform the adversary system to keep it in its
place and keep most of my audience and beginning with the most radical
of proposals so you will happily adopt all of my more modest
suggestions.
A.

Adversarialism Where It Is Appropriate

Being something of a provocateur, I will start with a radical, yet
benign suggestion. Since the adversary system has not been empirically
validated as the most effective legal system9 5 , let us think about what it
does best and attempt to cabin its influence to those cases which need the
"full-court press" of adversarialism. Then, let's move on to think about
what other processes are appropriate to serve other goals96 . Many of you
will think that all criminal cases belong in the former category, where the
state faces a lone individual's potential loss of freedom-I do not think
all criminal cases belong there97 . Others think that all disputes that
involve some "public question" belong in open court with fully contested
98
arguments and rules designed to create fairness of process and result.
Still others would include cases that involve large numbers of people,
like the mass tort, consumer and securities cases we face. Still others
suggest that we need adversarial, conventional processes precisely when
the parties are unequal so that the court may police resource and
"performativity" imbalances.99 For me the operative principles are party
choice and use of the adversary system where it is most appropriate and
always available, literally as a "court of last resort."'' 0
95. See discussion in Luban, supra note I; Thibaut & Walker, supra note 43 and critiques
thereof in Damaska, supra note 86.
96. So much of the writing on the adversary system is done by those who imagine either a
criminal or civil paradigm and then attempt to impose some universal system applicable to both. Call
me a post-modem, but I think there is enough variation in our case types, that neither process rules
nor ethics rules can continue to be totally global and transsubstantive, see Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 84.
97. As William Simon has controversially suggested it is not always true that state powers are
superior to criminal defendants. See Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 U. Mich. L. Rev.
1703 (1993).
98. See e.g. Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Res. 211 (1995); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm,
83 Geo. L.J. 2619 (1995).
99. Richard Delgado et. al. Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wisc. L. J. 1359; Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.
J. 1073 (1984).
100. Lest you think I am an ADR romanticist, last month I was involved as a plaintiff and
counsel (with my husband) in three lawsuits (all after other forms of dispute resolution failed). After
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B.

Other Possible Forms of Dispute/Conflict Resolution

But what I most want to think about are other forms of legal dispute
resolution. In what circumstances could we safely begin to experiment
with other forms of process, through which we could explore other forms
of interaction and ethics? Many scholars in the dispute resolution field
have called on us to provide both "thick description" and analysis of
different modes of conflict resolution that have been successful, even in
perceived intractable disputes."t' Mindful of the post-modern and multicultural critiques of legal knowledge, could we imagine a forum where
more than two voices could be heard? Here I will sketch some possible
alternative modes of dispute resolution to consider.
Where more than two sides to a dispute are involved could we
imagine processes with more than plaintiffs and defendants? In a modification to old historical forms, could we imagine a tri-partite criminal
proceeding with state interests, victim interests and defendants interests
all represented? Or, as has occurred in a variety of environmental siting,
community block grants and other multi-party situations, could we utilize
a multi-party mediation-like process in which a single dispute is used to
broaden community and democratic participation in a single issue that
affects more than two parties and establishes a process for greater participation?102 Reg-neg (negotiated rule-making or regulatory negotiation)
represents another example of current recognition that other than conventional adversarial processes may more effectively involve more than two
parties and lend greater legitimacy to the result if people are involved in
the construction of rules before they take effect.'0 3 Could we further
adapt our current forms of sub-classes, multi-party, multi-district litigafiling, two of the three settled. (For the case typologists among you, the collection and copyright
infringement cases settled, the landlord-tenant (damages, not eviction) did not. By the way, we
"won" the damage case, in the sense of getting a judgment; we have yet to collect a dime. Thus, the
full trial that we had did nothing to increase the justice or efficacy of our claim.
101. See e.g. Deborah Kolb and Associates, When Talk Works: Profiles of Mediators (1994);
Donald Schon & Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy
Controversies (1994); Marc Howard Ross, The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and
Interests in Comparative Perspective (1993) (arguing that it is particularly important to study the
psychocultural specifics of both successful and failed efforts); Conflict, Cooperation and Justice:
Essays Inspired by the work of Morton Deutsch, (Barbara Benedict Bunker, Jeffrey Rubin and
Associates, eds. 1995).
102. See Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking The Impasse (1989); Kolb,
supra note 101, Profile of Larry Susskind, 309-54.
103. See e.g. Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L. J. 1
(1982); Lawrence Susskind and Gerald McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 3 Yale J. Reg. 133 (1985).

70

JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 1:49

tion, and other forms of consolidation to allow for more than "two sides"
04
to civil cases with a variety of private and public issues at stake.1
In the Center in which I work at UCLA (the Center for Inter-racial/
Inter-ethnic Conflict Resolution) we have begun to develop formats and
fora for discussion of divisive issues that attempt to alter the debate mode
and focus instead on structured, reframed, multi-party "representational"
and diverse conversation. In a recent forum on affirmative action, for
example, (a very disputed issue on my campus and in my state) we
organized a forum designed to avoid adversarial and debate-like
presentations. The process involved four diverse presenters (both in
views and issues and demographics' 0 5 ) who gave brief statements of
their views on the subject which included statements about how their
personal and individual histories have affected their views, and who were
then asked a series of probative questions by a moderator-facilitator.
(These questions were designed to probe more than adversarial stated
extreme positions, such as "what are the grey areas in your thinking?.
What evidence would you need to change your mind? What did you
learn from hearing the other presenters?") These questions were followed
by presenters questioning each other (facilitated by a question-reframer
who attempted to dislodge the personal attacks or hostility in questions
and responses), followed by audience questioning, and concluding with
an attempt to draft a statement that reflected commonalities and differences of thinking and where more information was required. All of this
was followed by a process critique session by the audience.
I recognize that such a procedure might not work where civil damages have to be assessed or guilt determined (though I wonder), but it
certainly could be used for policy deliberations and in the negotiation
and settlement of large multi-party lawsuits.'0 6 Lani Guinier and Susan
104. For my argument that cases are not so easily denominated "public" or "private" see
Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It, Anyway? A Democratic and Philosophical Defense of
Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 Geo. L. J. 2663 (1995).
105. Thus, illustrating both demographic and positional diversity. There were ranges of view on
what kind of affirmative action was appropriate in the educational arena (differences in admissions,
educational programs, employment and contracting) and what groups should be part of such plans as
well as the view that there should be no affirmative action at all. (In a very "PC" environment, the
latter view is not easy to openly express and was accomplished because of the process protections
offered.)
106. Indeed, with the exception of representative-advocates of each "party" this structure is not
that dissimilar from a multi-party private mini-trial, where the principals are intended to complete
the negotiation and resolution. CPR, The Mini-Trial: Practice Guide (1988). If the audience
participated in drafting the statement or agreement, we might have something that looked like a
summary jury trial. See Thomas Lambros, A Summary Jury Trial Primer, in Donovan Leisure
Newton & Irvine, ADR Practice Guide (John Wilkerson,ed. 1990).
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Sturm at the University of Pennsylvania have experimented with similar
and other formats in their class on race and gender theory, with similar
purposes, to reduce the distortions of adversary dialogue and the hope
that individuals would be empowered to fully confront their own and
others' views without attachment to "side" or "identity." They label their
class an "intermediate space" for discussion, conversation and dialogue,
rather than debate. Similarly, I have called mediation an "intermediate
space' 0 7" where individual disputants can meet outside of both more
informal (family or workplace) and formal (court or formal grievance)
settings. Intermediate spaces,' 0 8 even without formal or complexily facilitated rules, may allow for more authentic grappling with issues and differences °9 and the stakes may be lowered." In such environments, as
with privately negotiated settlements, we may arrive at contingent agreements, promises to meet and confer again, contingent performances,
plans for the future without adjudication of the past-all illustrations of
post-modem acceptance of some uncertainty and the need to combine
past disputes with present and future action.
More conventionally, we might examine the circumstances under
which some forms of the civil inquisitorial/investigative procedures
make sense, its major advantage being that a non-partisan investigation
leads to (at least in theory) a "genuine search for truth." Some governmental and regulatory questions may be handled this way, and as long as
no individual liberty may be at issue even the most confirmed adversarialist might acknowledge it is likely to be both more effective and likely
cheaper"'. Even the United Kingdom, with its commitment to the adversary system, employs governmental investigatory commissions and pro2
cedures far more than we do."
107. Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions,
Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11 Neg. J. 217 (1995).
108. Another personal favorite of mine is the bookstore reading. In a recent reading in
Washington DC, Derrick Bell demonstrated the democratic power of such sites by engaging in
conversation, (after reading) with a very diverse audience of young and old, black and white, who
both supported and challenged his views (and his own position) on race relations treated in Faces At
the Bottom of the Well: The Persistence of Racism (1992).
109. And perhaps come closer to achieving Jurgen Habbermas' "ideal speech conditions," see
Jurgen Habbermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2 (1987).
110. How much would the OJ Simpson trial be different without the press coverage and play by
play sports commentary?
11. Note I am not suggesting this in some circumstances as now used when a "neutral" court
officer investigates something like parental fitness and makes recommendations to the court without
adversary contestation.
112. See examples of Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (following investigation of
several cases of "miscarriages" and false convictions in political trials), and white papers and green
papers on important legal issues affecting public policy.
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I strongly believe that we are on the right track in experimenting
with and using a variety of forms of "alternative dispute resolution"-I
prefer the new term-"appropriate dispute resolution." Yet, as I have
stated elsewhere, I fear many of these forms (mediation, mini-trials, settlement conferences, early neutral evaluations, reg-neg) are becoming
corrupted by the persistence of adversarial values. (Other forms of
"ADR" like arbitration, summary jury and bench trials are intended to be
more conventionally adversarial.) It is clear that lawyers and third party
neutrals will have to learn new ways of being in mediation and programs
for teaching people to be effective problem-solvers and (heaven forbid,
advocates) within the ADR process are beginning to crop up. This is a
good thing because if the weaknesses of adversarialism are to be dealt
with, new mind-sets about law practice will be necessary.'
Fact-finding, third party neutraling and judging might need to be
considered as well. Some years ago I suggested that if there was any
merit to gender differences in judging and fact-finding we might consider
male-female judge teams, instead of one judge, who had to decide
together." 4 Consider how both our judge and jury roles and selection
would have to be changed to fully reflect "multi-cultural" considerations
in decision-making and process facilitation.
Related to this is a concern close to my heart and that is whether
15
different forms of process will require different ethical requirements?'
Should lawyers attending an in-office early neutral evaluation session
with volunteer lawyers appointed by the court"16 have a duty of candor to
the tribunal (under MRPC 3.3)? What conflicts of interests rules should
17
be applied to those who both mediate and work with litigators?'
113. See Marguerite Millhauser, The Unspoken Resistance to Alternative Dispute Resolution, 3
Neg.J. 29 (1987); Id. Gladiators and Conciliators: ADR-A Law Firm Staple, 14 Bar Leader 20
(1988).
114. See Menkel-Meadow, Portia In A Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering
Process, 1 Berkeley W. L. J. 39, 59 (1985); see also Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist
Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1877 (1988).
115. See Robert McKay, Ethical Considerations in ADR, in Donovan Leisure, Newton &
Irvine, ADR Practice Book (John Wilkerson, ed.1990); Menkel-Meadow, Professional
Responsibility for Third Party Neutrals, 11 (9) Alternatives (1993); Baruch Bush, The Dilemmas of
Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications, National Institute for
Dispute Resolution (1992).
116. This is the practice in the Northern District of California.
117. See G. Hazard, When ADR is Ancillary to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront
Conflicts Issues, 12(2) Alternatives 147 (1994); Menkel-Meadow, Ancillary Practice and Conflicts
of Interests: When the Lawyer Ethics Rules Are Not Enough, 13 (2) Alternatives 15 (1995); PolySoftware Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D.Utah, 1995); Menkel-Meadow, conflicts and
Mediation Practice, Dispute Resolution Magazine (Spring, 1996) at 5.
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C. Reforming the Adversary System and Legal Ethics
For those who think that it is not the structure of the adversary system, but the extremes of behavior within it that are the problem, I offer a
not original list of potential procedural and ethical reforms, though I
must admit I am both cynical about policing efforts and skeptical that
reforms won't themselves become the victims of the adversarial process
as we have seen with Rule 11 reforms" 18 and are beginning to see with
recent disclosure reforms 1 9.
So, if we are concerned about the excesses of adversarial behavior
we could prohibit the coaching of witnesses, 120 require earlier and more
forthright disclosure of adverse, as well as favorable facts and witnesses 12 1 and adverse legal authority 122 in both civil and criminal cases,
require all lawyers, not just prosecutors to "do justice 123"' in lieu of only
serving their clients' interests, prohibit the cross-examination of witnesses "known" to the lawyer to be telling the truth and prohibit the
24
presentation of any evidence at all "known" to be false by the attorney
and impose serious sanctions for violations of these rules. We could
more radically require equalization of resources of the advocates (either
taxing the wealthier litigant or providing more public subsidies for
poorer litigants) but given our current reluctance to pay for free legal
services for the poor and to enter into real fee shifting arrangements (not
to mention the socialist nature of this proposal), I doubt we will ever
come close to realizing this. Furthermore, I suspect even if economic
resources were equalized there might still be an inequality in raw, legal
talent in many cases (it is the man/(sic) and not the art, remember who
makes arguments). Should we assign lawyers to cases on a random or
118. See e.g. Richard Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater. The Prospects for Procedural Progress,
59 Brooklyn L. Rev. 761 (1993).
119. Charles Sorenson, Disclosure Under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (a)-"Much
Ado About Nothing," 46 Hastings L. J. 679 (1995).
120. Who would police such a private activity? See J.J.
White supra note 12 for similar
arguments about regulating private negotiation activity.
121. As we are trying, somewhat unsuccessfully, to do with reforms to Rule 26(a) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure.
122. See MRPC 3.3 (a) (3).
123. See MRPC Rule 3.8.
124. These latter examples make adversarialists cringe. They raise the important issue of
deciding when it is appropriate for the lawyer to judge his own client, See David Mellinkoff, The
Conscience of A Lawyer (1973) and raises important epistemological concerns about how we
"know" the truth. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). If my post-modernist critiques apply
to the truth finding process of the adversary system, they would apply a fortiori to a client's own
lawyer who often has nothing more than a client or witness interview to go on.
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lottery basis? z5 Could we ever equalize advocacy skills' 2 6 so that it was
really the "merits" (whatever that might be in a post-modem world) and
not the performance that drove the result?
Thus, while I would like to see abuses of adversarial behavior
curbed (and I still think professional reputation does more to police this
than anything else, interspersed with a few very public scandals, like
Kay, Scholer in Lincoln Savings 27 , that cause us once in a while to reexamine our loyalties and rules' 28 ), I am skeptical that the adversary system can really be reformed by ethics rules changes. Adversarialism is so
powerful a heuristic and organizing framework for our culture, that like a
great whale, it seems to swallow up any effort to modify it or transform
it. Some have made more of the change in language in the Model Rules
from "zealous" advocacy 129 to diligence.' 30 I still see the loophole in the
language of the comments (where zeal continues to rear its dragon-like
smoke), but none can point to any change of behavior that has resulted
from that language change (remember the deconstructionists' view about
indeterminate language with no meaning!).
D.

Objections and Responses: Conclusion

Although I seem to have come to bury the adversary system I do
think it has its value and there are likely to be a number of objections to
my criticisms and proposals. As a former trial lawyer and continuing
reluctant adversarialist' 3 t I will canvas a few objections and attempt to
respond.
125. Although in principle our system is based on client choice of lawyer we know there are
many exceptions to this in assignment of public defenders and criminal and civil court appointed
lawyers, in assignment to lawyers in pre-paid legal plans and even, for most of us, when our liability
insurance carriers provide our defense. With increasing use of managed care and health maintenance
organizations in health delivery, many of us no longer have choice of our doctors-should lawyers
be allocated any differently? When a lottery system of legal services was proposed some years ago
for legal indigents, see Marshall Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L.
Rev. 281 (1980) I strongly opposed it, on class terms, but it might be different if it were applied to
all litigants.
126. Asking some lawyers to be "dumb and dumber" while we try to make others smart and
smarter?
127. See e.g. Dennis Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kay, Scholer, The Office of
Thrift Supervision and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 So. Cal. L. Rev. 985 (1993); George Brown,
Financial Institutions Lawyers As Quasi-Public Enforcers, 7 Geo. J. Leg. Eth. 637 (1994).
128. Others in this program will explore the specific issues entailed in whistleblowing on one's
own client and implications for client confidentiality and loyalty.
129. CPR 7-101
130. MRPC 1.3
131. I usually refuse speaking engagements styled in debate mode; I refuse all offers to be an
expert witness in legal malpractice or professional responsibility cases; I no longer teach Trial
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Some will say the lady doth protest too much-indeed there is not
enough of an adversary system left today-an argument I suspect
Monroe Freedman will make. With the high settlement rates and large
number of plea bargains 32 too few cases ever see the full test of the
adversary system at its best. At another level, critics like Gary Bellow
and Judith Resnik suggest that a hybrid form of process-a bureaucratic
form of process- exists, both in and out of courts, where there is an
increase of judicial and administrative management of cases 133 or where,
even in court, judges apply more discretionary, bureaucratic rules and
continue to push the parties toward settlement. Others suggest that all the
attempts to cure the ills of civil litigation (with ADR, Rule 11, disclosure
rules, civility rules) will destroy the criminal justice system where the
client needs a fully armed advocate 34 . Most telling (to me) is the fear
that if we tame the adversarial dragon too much, even in civil cases, our
famous expensive and tedious discovery process will not be able to turn
out the occasional jewel of achievement in locating that famous135"smoking memo" that informs the rest of us of serious wrong doing.
In addition, while I have labored long and hard to canvas the faults
of the adversary system, we know that any system we would substitute
for it would have other flaws, perhaps worse, for those who fear the
power of state investigators, or the absence of clear standards or governing rules in private dispute resolution processes. I often teach about
the role of the lawyer in the adversary system by looking at the historical
cycles in which the juvenile justice system has turned.' 36 What began as
a more private, benevolent, but paternalistic, system (without adversary
protections) was converted during the Due Process revolution to virtually
the full panoply of adult adversarial adjudication techniques and protection. Most recently, with the advent of ADR and more sophisticated (or
Advocacy, and I mediate and arbitrate but as anyone who knows me will say, I can still argue and
become quite adversarial.
132. These are rapidly decreasing in states like California with "three strikes and you're out"
laws. It is estimated that soon all of the 591 courts in the county of Los Angeles will be occupied
with criminal cases where third time offenders will no longer plea bargain. There may be no civil
adversary system left (if full trial is contemplated). See Stephanie Simon, Civil Courts Also Feel
Squeeze of '3 Strikes' Cases, Los Angeles Times, August 13, 1995, A-1.
133. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harvard L. Rev. 76 (1982).
134. See Silver, supra note 9.
135. The Pinto case, the asbestos litigation. Paul Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct (1985);
Richard Sobel, Bending the Law (1991). Now the tobacco cases are examples of these triumphs of
our adversary system.
136. My text is my colleague's Murray Schwartz' Lawyers and the Legal Profession, 2d ed.
(1985) which raises questions about the value of the adversary system by starting with the Gault (In
re Gault, 387 U.S. i (1967) decision.
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simply different psychological) models we have moved closer again to
more flexible, private, individualized settlements and treatment programs
(although now the juvenile at least has a lawyer). A similar story can be
told with respect to some government benefit programs and adjudicatory
and administrative decision-making. Thus, process itself is subject to the
same "paradigm shifts" (or trends or fads) as other intellectual
frameworks. (You can see this is coming to a post-modem conclusion.)
Thus, though I am not happy with the structural, epistemological,
remedial and behavioral aspects of the adversarial system, I am skeptical
that we can reform it by changing some ethical or procedural rules. What
is required is cultural change and that is not so easy to legislate. What I
urge instead, is the cabining of the adversarial system to where it can do
its best work, with all the limitations I have described. I would prefer that
we take the teachings of post-modernism and multi-culturalism seriously
enough to consider other forms and formats of conflict and dispute resolution (many personed and sided presentations of facts and disputes with
more deliberative and participatory party and fact-finding processes) and
begin to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses as we come to develop
something of a typology for assessing which cases belong in which ADR
37
process.'
I believe that each process will need to carry its own ethics-the
zeal of the advocate does not play well in mediation and the mediator is
both more active and more complex a third party neutral than the judge
to be governed by the Judicial Code of Conduct.' 3 8 Thus, to take up a
more radical strain of post-modernism-our legal processes and ethics
are "in play" (or in the French, "at play").
Our experimentation with ADR and other forms of legal process
reflects our collective dissatisfaction (for a wide diversity of reasons)
with the traditional adversary model and our current post-modern
penchant for "many methods," when one will not suffice. I firmly believe
that the only way to reform the adversary model is to successfully
"oppose" it with other modes and processes and see if we can create a
more varied legal system, more post-modernly sensitive to the particular
needs of parties and the particularities of cases. I do not think any one
micro reform or any single process will successfully supplant and replace
the adversary system, but I hope that the post-post modern legal system
137. See e.g. Frank Sander and Stephen Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 Neg. J. 49 (1994).
138. At least one judge thus far has applied the conflict standards of the Judicial Code of
Conduct to a court-appointed mediator-special master, see In re Asbestos Litigation 737 F. Supp.
735 (E.D. N.Y., 1990) (Judge Weistein on ethics of Ken Feinberg).
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will give parties a greater choice about how they want to resolve their
39 ' '
disputes. That will allow lawyers who want to be "moral activists,,
problem-solvers 40 , lawyers for the situation' 4 ' or the community 4 2 , discretionary lawyers," 4 3 civic republicans'" or statesmen 45 to have
greater flexibility in the models they choose and not everyone will have
to be a "hired gun" in an epistemological system that is crumbling as we
speak.
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